Preemption Operators by Besnard, Philippe et al.
Preemption Operators
Philippe Besnard, E´ric Gre´goire, Se´bastien Ramon
To cite this version:
Philippe Besnard, E´ric Gre´goire, Se´bastien Ramon. Preemption Operators. 20th European
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI’12), 2012, Montpellier, France. pp.893-894, 2012.
<hal-00867922>
HAL Id: hal-00867922
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00867922
Submitted on 30 Sep 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Preemption Operators
Philippe Besnard
IRIT CNRS UMR 5505
118 route de Narbonne
F-31065 Toulouse, France
besnard@irit.fr
E´ric Gre´goire and Se´bastien Ramon
CRIL CNRS UMR 8188 - Universite´ d’Artois
Rue Jean Souvraz SP18
F-62307 Lens, France
{gregoire,ramon}@cril.fr
Abstract
We introduce a family of operators for belief change
that aim at making a new piece of information to be pre-
emptive so that any former belief subsuming it is given
up. That is, the current belief base is to be altered even in
the case that it is logically consistent with the new piece
of information. Existing operators for belief revision are
inadequate for this purpose because they amount to set-
theoretic union in a contradiction-free case. We propose
a series of postulates for such preemption operators. We
show that a preemption operator can be defined as a
multiple contraction followed by an expansion, drawing
on operators from belief revision.
Introduction
Formalizing belief change is a major topic in Artificial Intel-
ligence. Belief revision is dedicated to the special case that
a new piece of information must be taken into account, as a
statement to be inserted in the belief base. Should the current
belief base be contradicted by the new piece of information,
then the current belief base must undergo some modifica-
tions before it can simply be unioned with the new piece of
information, resulting in a new current belief base.
The AGM setting gives a logic-based characterization of
revision operators via a list of postulates that a “rational” re-
vision operator is meant to satisfy (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors,
and Makinson 1985; Ga¨rdenfors 1988). Two of the postu-
lates, vacuity and inclusion, when taken together, enforce the
property that the belief base is simply supplemented with
the new piece of information in the case that the latter is
logically consistent with the belief base: in such a case, no
information is to be expelled from the belief base (see Ap-
pendix). However, should the new piece of information be
preemptive in a belief base that it can be deduced from, then
some information must be taken out –this may happen to
be necessary even though the current belief base is logically
consistent with the new piece of information.
An illustration is as follows. Assume that the current be-
lief base expresses “Paul is in his office or at home”. Con-
sider the situation that the information “Paul is in his office
or at home or at his club” is then provided. In some respects,
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if the information “Paul is in his office or at home or at his
club” is now at hand, it presumably should take precedence
over the former information. That is, “Paul is in his office
or at home” should no longer be deduced from the belief
base. The new piece of information “Paul is in his office
or at home or at his club” conveys some uncertainty that
Paul’s office or home are where he is right now. Yet, from a
purely logical viewpoint, the new piece of information “Paul
is in his office or at home or at his club” does not contradict
the current belief base. Moreover, “Paul is in his office or
at home or at his club” provides per se no means to obvi-
ate “Paul is in his office or at home” from which it can be
deduced.
Here is another illustration. Assume that “If Dana agrees
then we begin tomorrow” is in the current belief base. Pre-
sumably, a new, incoming, belief stating that “If Dana and
Alexander agree then we begin tomorrow” is meant to rule
out the former belief although they do not form a contradic-
tion in terms of classical logic.
There recently has been some work dealing with this,
in a classical logic setting (Besnard, Gre´goire, and Ra-
mon 2011a) and in a non-monotonic logic setting (Besnard,
Gre´goire, and Ramon 2011b). It is shown there that ex-
pelling from the belief base every piece of information f
entailing (possibly through other information from the belief
base) the preemptive information g is not enough. The way
the problem is addressed in (Besnard, Gre´goire, and Ramon
2011a; 2011b) is to apply contraction of the current belief
base by g ⇒ f , for prime implicants f of g, then add g.
This paper is a first attempt at providing postulates for
such preemption operators. It is also shown that a preemp-
tion operator can be alternatively defined as multiple con-
traction (Fuhrmann and Hansson 1994) (of appropriate for-
mulas) followed by expansion. Finally, a related work, Hans-
son’s replacement operator (Hansson 2009), is discussed.
We consider classical logic throughout. We assume a
propositional language L defined using a finite list of propo-
sitional variables and the usual connectives ¬ (negation), ∧
(conjunction), ∨ (disjunction),⇒ (material implication). ⊥
stands for a contradiction and⊤ stands for a tautology. A lit-
eral is a propositional variable or its negation. A clausal for-
mula (called a clause) is a finite disjunction of literals. Low-
ercase letters denote formulas of L whereas uppercase let-
ters denote sets of formulas, these being called belief bases.
Cn denotes deductive closure: Cn(A) denotes the set of
all deductive consequences of A. A theory A is a deduc-
tively closed set of formulas, A = Cn(A). Alternatively,
p ∈ Cn(A) can also be written A ⊢ p. ⊢ p means that
p is tautologous and ⊢ ¬p that p is a contradiction. Two
formulas p and q are logically equivalent, written p ≡ q,
iff p ∈ Cn({q}) and q ∈ Cn({p}). Throughout, it is as-
sumed that belief bases are deductively closed unless stated
otherwise. As usual, a set of formulas A is consistent iff
⊥ 6∈ Cn(A). K⊥ is the trivial belief base, i.e., it consists
of all formulas of L. K⊤ is the tautologous belief base, i.e.,
it consists of the tautologous formulas of L. The concept of
strict implicant is central to this paper: f is a strict implicant
of g iff f ⊢ g and g 6⊢ f .
Postulates
Let K be a consistent belief base and g a clause. Let + be
an AGM expansion operator (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and
Makinson 1985; Ga¨rdenfors 1988) (see Appendix). Preemp-
tion by g overK is denotedK ⊛ g. Here is a tentative list of
postulates for ⊛.
(K⊛ 1) K ⊛ g is a theory. (closure)
I.e., similarly with revision, the output of preemption is re-
quired to be deductived closed.
(K⊛ 2) g ∈ K ⊛ g. (success of insertion)
I.e., similarly with revision, the new piece of information is
meant to be part of the resulting belief base.
(K⊛ 3) f /∈ K ⊛ g for all clausal strict implicants f of g.
(success of preemption)
(K⊛ 3) is in contrast with revision. Here, no clausal strict
implicant f of g is allowed in the resulting belief base. If g
is a contradiction, no formula of L is a strict implicant of g
according to classical logic, hence the postulate vacuously
holds despite Property 1 below.
Observe that (K⊛ 3) cannot be extended to all strict im-
plicants of g because, together with (K⊛ 1) and (K⊛ 2),
it would entail thatK⊛g be logically equivalent with g (see
Property 3).
(K⊛ 4) K ⊛ g ⊆ K + g. (inclusion)
In other words, preempting never introduces beliefs beyond
those in (the deductive closure of) the expansion ofK by g.
(K⊛ 5) If (g ⇒ f) /∈ K for all clausal strict implicants f
of g thenK + g ⊆ K ⊛ g. (vacuity)
I.e., if no g ⇒ f is inK, whatever f clausal strict implicant
of g, then preempting amounts to expanding (K by g).
(K⊛ 6) If g ≡ h thenK ⊛ g = K ⊛ h. (extensionality)
That is, similarly with revision, the outcome of preempting
does not depend on the “syntax” of g.
The following property shows that the only way a trivial
belief base results from preempting is by means of preempt-
ing by a contradiction.
Property 1. Let ⊛ satisfy (K⊛ 1), (K⊛ 2) and (K⊛ 3).
Then,K ⊛ g = K⊥ iff ⊢ ¬g.
The following property states that if g is tautologous, then
the outcome of preempting is a tautologous belief base.
Property 2. Let ⊛ satisfy (K⊛ 2) and (K⊛ 3). Then, if
⊢ g thenK ⊛ g = K⊤.
The property below formally states the case mentioned in
the comment following (success of preemption).
Property 3. Let⊛ satisfy (K⊛ 1) and (K⊛ 2). Then, f /∈
K ⊛ g for all strict implicants f of g iff K ⊛ g is logically
equivalent with g.
The next property shows why (vacuity) does not require
a proviso about the negation of g not to be in K (please
observe that such a proviso occurs in the corresponding pos-
tulate for revision operators).
Property 4. If g ⇒ f /∈ K for all clausal strict implicants
f of g then ¬g /∈ K.
As by Property 5, it is otiose to check in (vacuity) that
disjunctions of g ⇒ fi (for distinct clausal strict implicants
fi’s of g) are not inK.
Property 5. LetK and g be such that (g ⇒ f) /∈ K for all
clausal strict implicants f of g. Then, there exist no clausal
strict implicants i and j of g such that (i ∨ j) 6≡ g and
(g ⇒ i) ∨ (g ⇒ j) ∈ K.
Characterization
According to (Besnard, Gre´goire, and Ramon 2011a;
2011b), similarly to Levi’s identity (Ga¨rdenfors 1988) defin-
ing revision as contraction followed by expansion, a preemp-
tion operation could be captured as multiple contraction fol-
lowed by expansion. As given by Fuhrmann and Hansson
(Fuhrmann and Hansson 1994), multiple contraction permits
to contract a belief base K by a set of information Λ, writ-
tenK ⊖Λ, so that no information of Λ can be inferred from
K ⊖ Λ (see Appendix).
Definition 1 ( ||| operator). Let {f1, f2, . . . , fn, . . .} be the
set of all clausal strict implicants of g.
K ||| g = (K ⊖ {g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,..) + g.
Theorem 1. If ⊖ satisfies (K ⊖ 1)− (K ⊖ 4) and (K ⊖ 6),
and if + satisfies (K + 1) − (K + 6), then ||| satisfies
(K ⊛ 1)− (K ⊛ 6).
Theorem 2. Every⊛ operator satisfying (K⊛1)−(K⊛6)
can be written as an ||| operator s.t. ⊖ satisfies (K ⊖ 1)−
(K ⊖ 4) and (K ⊖ 6), and + satisfies (K + 1)− (K + 6).
Related work: Hansson’s replacement
operator
As given by Hansson in (Hansson 2009), replacement per-
mits to replace in a belief base K a proposition p by
a proposition q, written K|pq . Similarly to Levi’s identity
(Ga¨rdenfors 1988), in (Hansson 2009) it is shown that a re-
placement operation could be captured as a contraction by
q ⇒ p followed by an expansion by q.
Should there exist a multiple replacement operator ex-
tending Hansson’s, applying it to our preemption problem
would be as follows. The above p would rather be a set of
formulas ∆ (consisting here of the clausal strict implicants
of g and q would be g). The desired outcome would be that
K|∆q ∩∆ = ∅. Of course, q ∈ K|
∆
q would still be enforced.
Now, the question is: Can we find a way such that the de-
sired outcome w.r.t. our preemption problem could still be
obtained through Hansson’s operator? At this stage, a useful
observation is that g is a clause. Hence, the set of clausal
strict implicants of g is finite. Although ∆ definitely cannot
be captured via identifying p with the disjunction
∨
δ∈∆ (it
is equivalent with g), it seems possible to get the same out-
come in our preemption problem by means of
K|∆q =
⋂
p∈∆
K|pq .
In particular, set-theoretic intersection applies only finitely
many times as∆ is the (finite) set of clausal strict implicants
of g. Also, please observe that in contrast to maxichoice con-
traction
⋂
(K⊥p) yielding (the deductive closure of) p, no
such problem arises here as set-theoretic intersection is not
applied to all maximal subsets consistent with¬p, only some
of them through Hansson’s operator. In any case, consider
the following operator, based on Hansson’s replacement op-
erator:
K |||H g =
⋂
f∈{f1,f2,...,fn,...}
K|fg
where {f1, f2, . . . , fn, . . .} is the (finite) set of all clausal
strict implicants of g. It follows from the properties of Hans-
son’s replacement operator that the desired features g ∈
K |||H g and K |||H g ∩ {f1, f2, . . . , fn, . . .} = ∅ are en-
forced. However, a concern remains. Even in the event that
|||H be a preemption operator, it does not necessarily mean
that Hansson’s operator is sufficient. It might be the case
that some preemption operators cannot be written as a |||H
operator. Intuitively, the reason is that a fixed Hansson’s op-
erator might turn out to be short of capturing an arbitrary
preemption operator.
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AGM Operators
Let K be a consistent base, Λ be a set of formulas and g be
a formula.
Expansion (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985)
The postulates for the expansion ofK by g, denotedK + g,
are:
(K+ 1) K + g is a theory. (closure)
(K+ 2) g ∈ K + g. (success)
(K+ 3) K ⊆ K + g. (inclusion)
(K+ 4) If g ∈ K thenK + g = K. (vacuity)
(K+ 5) IfK ⊆ H thenK + g ⊆ H + g. (monotony)
(K+ 6) K + g is the smallest set satisfying
(K + 1) to (K + 5). (minimality)
Revision (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985)
The postulates for the revision of K by g, denoted K ∗ g,
are:
(K ∗ 1) K ∗ g is a theory. (closure)
(K ∗ 2) g ∈ K ∗ g. (success)
(K ∗ 3) K ∗ g ⊆ K + g. (inclusion)
(K ∗ 4) If ¬g /∈ K thenK + g ⊆ K ∗ g. (vacuity)
(K ∗ 5) K ∗ g = K⊥ iff ⊢ ¬g. (consistent)
(K ∗ 6) If g ≡ h thenK ∗ g = K ∗ h. (extensionality)
(K ∗ 7) K ∗ (g ∧ h) ⊆ (K ∗ g) + h.
(conjunctive inclusion)
(K ∗ 8) If ¬h /∈ K ∗ g then
(K ∗ g) + h ⊆ K ∗ (g ∧ h). (conjunctive vacuity)
(K ∗7)-(K ∗8) are additional postulates devoted to minimal
change.
Multiple contraction (Fuhrmann and Hansson 1994)
The postulates for the multiple contraction of K by Λ,
denotedK ⊖ Λ, are:
(K⊖ 1) K ⊖ Λ is a theory. (closure)
(K⊖ 2) K ⊖ Λ ⊆ K. (inclusion)
(K⊖ 3) If Λ ∩K = ∅ thenK ⊖ Λ = K. (vacuity)
(K⊖ 4) If Λ ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ then
Λ ∩ (K ⊖ Λ) = ∅. (success)
(K⊖ 5) K ⊆ Cn((K ⊖ Λ) ∪ Λ). (recovery)
(K⊖ 6) If Λ ∼= Θ thenK ⊖ Λ = K ⊖Θ.
(extensionality)
(K⊖ 7) (K ⊖ Λ) ∩ (K ⊖Θ) ⊆ K ⊖ (Λ ∩Θ).
(intersection)
(K⊖ 8) If ϕ /∈ K ⊖Θ then
K ⊖Θ ⊆ K ⊖ (Θ ∪ {ϕ}). (non-deterioration)
(K⊖ 9) If Λ ∩ (K ⊖Θ) = ∅ then
K ⊖Θ ⊆ K ⊖ (Λ ∪Θ). (conjonction)
Λ ∼= Θ means that for every element of Λ there exists a
logically equivalent element of Θ, and vice versa. Also,
(K ⊖ 7), (K ⊖ 8) and (K ⊖ 9) are additional postulates
devoted to minimal change.
Proofs
Property 1 Let ⊛ satisfy (K⊛ 1), (K⊛ 2) and (K⊛ 3).
Then,K ⊛ g = K⊥ iff ⊢ ¬g.
Proof of Property 1 (←) Assume ⊢ ¬g. That is, g ≡ ⊥. Ac-
cording to (K⊛2), g ∈ K⊛g, and, by (K⊛1),K⊛g = K⊥.
(→) Assume K ⊛ g = K⊥. Of course, ⊥ ∈ K⊥, and
⊥ ∈ K ⊛ g trivially ensues. By (K ⊛ 1), it then follows
that f ∈ K ⊛ g for every clausal strict implicant f of g.
However, (K ⊛ 3) means that f 6∈ K ⊛ g for every clausal
strict implicant f of g. Therefore, g has no clausal strict im-
plicant. The only clause that has no clausal strict implicant
is the empty clause. Hence, g ≡ ⊥ and ⊢ ¬g.
Property 2 Let⊛ satisfy (K⊛ 2) and (K⊛ 3). Then, if ⊢ g
thenK ⊛ g = K⊤.
Proof of Property 2 Let g be tautologous. Thus, all non-
tautologous clausal formulas of L are strict implicants of
g. By the conjunctive normal form theorem, each non-
tautologous formula is an implicant of a non-tautologous
clausal formula. Hence, (K ⊛ 3) and (K ⊛ 2) yield that
only tautologous formulas are inK ⊛ g.
Property 3 Let ⊛ satisfy (K⊛ 1) and (K⊛ 2). Then, f /∈
K ⊛ g for all strict implicants f of g iff (K ⊛ g) ≡ g.
Proof of Property 3 (→) Let h ∈ K ⊛ g. By (K⊛ 1) and
(K⊛ 2), g ∧ h ∈ K ⊛ g. Of course, g ∧ h ⊢ g. Should
g 6⊢ g ∧ h, then g ∧ h would be a strict implicant of g, and
the assumption that f /∈ K⊛g for all strict implicants f of g
would be contradicted. Therefore, g ⊢ g∧h. So, g ⊢ h. (←)
A strict implicant f of g is such that g 6⊢ f . Since (K⊛g) ≡
g, it follows that (K ⊛ g) 6⊢ f . By (K⊛ 1), f /∈ K ⊛ g.
Property 4 If g ⇒ f /∈ K for all clausal strict implicants f
of g then ¬g /∈ K.
Proof of Property 4 Assume ¬g ∈ K while (g ⇒ f) /∈ K
for all clausal strict implicants f of g. Since ¬g ∈ K andK
is a theory, (¬g ∨ x) ∈ K for all non-tautologous clause x
of L. Each clausal strict implicant f of g is clearly such an
x. I.e., ¬g ∨ f ∈ K for all clausal strict implicants f of g,
contradicting the assumption.
Property 5 Let K and g be such that (g ⇒ f) /∈ K for all
clausal strict implicants f of g. Then, there exist no clausal
strict implicants i and j of g such that (i ∨ j) 6≡ g and
(g ⇒ i) ∨ (g ⇒ j) ∈ K.
Proof of Property 5 Assume that such an i and such a j ex-
ist. ((g ⇒ i) ∨ (g ⇒ j)) ∈ K yields (g ⇒ (i ∨ j)) ∈ K
by virtue of classical logic since K is a theory. Now, the
disjunction of two strict implicants of g is either equiva-
lent with g or a strict implicant of g. In the former case,
(i ∨ j) ≡ g, contradicting the assumption. In the latter case,
(g ⇒ h) ∈ K where h = i ∨ j is a strict implicant of g,
contradicting the statement aboutK and g.
Theorem 1 If⊖ obeys (K⊖1)− (K⊖4) and (K⊖6), and
if + obeys (K + 1)− (K + 6), then ||| satisfies (K ⊛ 1)−
(K ⊛ 6).
Proof of Theorem 1 Trivially, if (K ⊖ 1) and (K + 1) are
satisfied, (K ⊛ 1) is satisfied, too.
In the same way, (K ⊛ 2) is trivially satisfied if (K + 2)
is.
Regarding (K ⊛ 3), if (K ⊖ 4) holds, then, for all clausal
strict implicants f of g, (g ⇒ f) /∈ K ⊖ {g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,...
Assume that there exists f ∈ K ⊛ g such that f is a clausal
strict implicant of g. FromK⊛g = (K⊖{g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,..)+
g, (K + 1) − (K + 2) together with (K + 6) imply g ⇒
f ∈ K ⊖{g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,... Then, a contradiction arises, and
(K ⊛ 3) is satisfied.
As to (K ⊛ 4), if (K ⊖ 2) is satisfied, K ⊖ {g ⇒
fi}i=1,2,.. ⊆ K. Applying (K + 5), it follows that (K ⊛ 4)
is satisfied.
Regarding (K⊛5), by (K⊖3), if for all clausal strict im-
plicants f of g, (g ⇒ f) /∈ K thenK ⊖ {g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,.. =
K. Hence,K ⊆ (K⊖{g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,..). Applying (K+3),
K + g ⊆ K ⊛ g and (K ⊛ 5) is satisfied.
Regarding (K ⊛ 6), if g ≡ h then the set Λ of all the
clausal strict implicants of g is exactly the set Θ of all the
clausal strict implicants of h. Then, Λ ∼= Θ (see Appendix).
By (K⊖6),K⊖Λ = K⊖Θ. By (K+5),K⊛g = K⊛h.
I.e., (K ⊛ 6) is satisfied.
Theorem 2 Every ⊛ operator satisfying (K ⊛ 1)− (K ⊛ 6)
can be written as an ||| operator s.t. ⊖ satisfies (K ⊖ 1)−
(K ⊖ 4) and (K ⊖ 6), and + satisfies (K + 1)-(K + 6).
Proof of Theorem 2We use the following usual definitions.
(Fuhrmann and Hansson 1994)
A selection function γ must be such that γ(K⊥Λ) = {K}
if K⊥Λ = ∅ and ∅ 6= γ(K⊥Λ) ⊆ K⊥Λ if K⊥Λ 6= ∅,
where for all deductively closedK,K ′,K ′′,
K⊥Λ
def
=
{
K ′ ⊆ K
K ′ ∩ Λ = ∅
K ′ ⊂ K ′′ ⊆ K ⇒ K ′′ ∩ Λ 6= ∅
}
If for all clausal strict implicants fi of g, g ⇒ fi 6∈ K, then
(K ⊛ 4) and (K ⊛ 5) together yieldK ⊛ g = K + g and it
is easy to see that any ⊖ satisfying (K ⊖ 3) would do.
Let then assume g ⇒ f ∈ K for some clausal strict impli-
cant f of g. By (K ⊛ 4),K ⊛ g ⊆ K + g = Cn(K ∪ {g})
(applying a theorem due to Ga¨rdenfors (Ga¨rdenfors 1988)
stating that Cn(K ∪ {·}) is the unique expansion operator
satisfying (K + 1) − (K + 6)). Due to (K ⊛ 2), K ⊛ g is
then logically equivalent with K ′ ∪ {g} for some K ′ ⊆ K.
Define
K =
{
X
X ∈ K⊥{g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,..
K ′ ⊆ X
∃x ∈ K \K ′ s.t. x⇒ (g ⇒ f) ∈ X
}
.
By (K ⊛ 3), for all clausal strict implicants fi of g, K
′ 6⊢
g ⇒ fi. Also, it is clear that, for all x ∈ K \K
′, there exists
X ∈ K such that x 6∈ X . Consequently,⋂
K = Cn(K ′).
Now, K ⊆ K⊥{g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,... Therefore, there exists a
selection function γ such that
γ(K⊥{g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,..) = Cn(K
′).
Take
K ⊖ {g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,.. =
⋂
γ(K⊥{g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,..).
By the latter, (K ⊖ 1) − (K ⊖ 6) hold (cf representation
theorem in (Fuhrmann and Hansson 1994)). By construc-
tion, too, K ⊖ {g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,.. = Cn(K
′). (K ⊖ {g ⇒
fi}i=1,2,..)∪{g} is therefore logically equivalent toK
′∪{g}
andK⊛g = Cn((K⊖{g ⇒ fi}i=1,2,..)∪{g}) then easily
ensues.
